Amsterdam Gender Theory Research Team (AGTRT)

[AGTRT-BT1] Sexual orientation: general principles

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by

Laurens Buijs
in

Jan Bergstra & Laurens Buijs
Amsterdam Gender Theory Research Team

Structure of this blog

  1. Introduction
  2. Views on sexual orientation
  3. Language use and sexual orientation
  4. Gender and sexual orientation
  5. Androgyny and sexual orientation
  6. Questions about sexual orientation
  7. Conclusion

1. Introduction

Sexual orientation (SO) is a central topic of sexology, and we see questions about the definition and applicability of SO as central to theoretical sexology(TS). Our research team will in the near future address the question of how the gender theories we have developed(FGT and ABGT) are applicable in the theorization of SO (see also AGTRT-BF57, AGTRT-BF58, AGTRT-BF59 and AGTRT-BF65).

Read more about FGT as a starting point for sexological theory:
Formal gender theory (FGT) as a starting point for theoretical sexology

The literature on SO is formidably large (5,000 papers or more), the history of the concept is complex and to arrive at definition of SO alone is unfeasible, at least in a compact way. To begin working on SO, we take formal gender theory (FGT) as a starting point and choose the following route:

  1. Taking some positions on SO that we want to hold for the long term and serve as a starting point.
  2. To formulate principles about the language we want to use, particularly concerning the distinction between categorical assertions and definitions and highly plausible, in the sense of most cases concerning assertions and definitions. A typical example is:
    • “A is B’s mother and A is therefore a woman.” As a categorical assertion, this assertion is not simply correct. For example, A might go through a gender transition after the birth of B, and after that transition, the conclusion of the claim is false. But the claim can be maintained as plausible : in most cases, the conclusion is correct.
  3. Making a connection to ABGT and formulating the questions we want to answer.

Learn more about the basics of gender and sexuality:
What is gender anyway, and why is biological sex not sufficient?

2. Views on sexual orientation

Views on SO:

  • There are gay men, and there are straight men. Between such persons there is a difference in sexual orientation.
  • There are lesbian women and there are straight women. Between such persons there is a difference in sexual orientation.
  • At least 5% of the population is male and gay or is female and lesbian. This is also the case in countries (or jurisdictions) where national politics do not recognize gay and lesbian as legitimate or even see them as non-existent.
  • By heteronormative is meant a system of norms that sees the heterosexual man and heterosexual woman as the norm and all other conditions as exceptions that preferably do not touch the daily lives of the heterosexual men and heterosexual women.
  • Above, we already see two sexual orientations: male-oriented (also called androphilic), and female-oriented (also called gynophilic). Both SO designations are monodirectional, or descriptions in which the direction in which the person described experiences attraction is leading.
  • There is a third option: targeting men as well as women (bisexual). In the theory of Robin Dembroff (see the article What is sexual orientation from 2016), these are central categories of ST (and precisely not homosexual versus heterosexual), in which we follow Dembroff.
  • There are at least three other monodirectional descriptions of ST: polysexual, pansexual, unmisexual, but the meaning of these terms actually depends on the version of gender theory one uses, and cannot be properly given without prior choices regarding gender theory.
  • In addition, there is then asexual and autosexual, both also to be seen as SO and in terms of designation also to be seen as monodirectional.
  • The above assertions are plausible and are independent of the precise meaning assigned to the terms male and female, that is, independent of the version of gender theory espoused.
  • It may be important to establish the SO of a person A. First of all, this may be of interest to A, but also to any partner B of A, and in some circumstances others may also claim knowledge concerning A regarding SO. The privacy aspects of this matter, are of great importance but are explicitly not our subject. Until further notice, we have nothing new to report on that.
  • It is conceivable that a person does not have a specific SO, and that can manifest itself in a variety of ways.
  • From the APA definition of SO, we adopt that there is a sustained pattern of actions, experiences of attraction or experiences of affection. A single event or experience is not decisive or sufficient for determining the SO in a specific person. The presence of sexual behavior provides an indication, but is not a prerequisite for determining ST.
  • A person P cannot be physically or affectively attracted to any other class of persons; such a person is called asexual in the literature. This is terminology we do not adopt because two possibilities remain: P can be sexually active on and with himself (then P is autosexual), or P can be sexually inactive altogether (then we call P asexual). Autosexual and asexual are two additional SOs, bringing the number of SOs we distinguish to 5.
  • Pedosexuality is not a separate SO but a manifestation of an underlying SO. This position is separate from any moral judgment about the permissibility of pedosexuality. But it is undesirable to “burden” the notion of (and theory about) SO with the implicit task of deciding on the status of pedosexuality by recognizing pedosexuality as an SO or not. This is avoided by explicitly not leaving this issue open.
  • With the introduction of neutral gender also arises (according to Dembroff) the notion of an SO involving a special attraction to or affection for gender-neutral persons. Whether or not this is the case we leave open. There are arguments for and also against. But the tradition of recognizing and facilitating diversity on SO provides little in this regard until say 2020 (outside of Dembroff’s 2016 work).
  • Being able to express different SOs outside the normative normative framework is an important degree of freedom that has been achieved in a number of countries in the last 125 years, but is also absent or even disappearing in a range of countries.
  • The letter combination LGBAA resulting from the above can be used independently and separately from T, Q and I. T, Q and I depend on the concept of gender much more than LGBAA. No conception of gender and of the possibilities of gender transition follows in advance, or even on systematic further reflection, from the view that on LGBAA degrees of freedom must exist or be fought for. The heterosexual SO (or SOs) are not mentioned here because there is no problem of social acceptance for this SO (at least not in the heteronormative society we still see around us today).

3. Language use and sexual orientation

Regarding the language, we have the following comments. Many assertions can be read in two ways: as categorical statements that always hold and as assertions that hold in very many cases, often so many cases that the need may arise to speak of “the normal case.” The meaning attributed to both readings may vary. Here are some examples:

  1. “A (by definition non-bisexual) male homosexual person A has permanent relationships exclusively with men.” For most gay men, that is an accurate statement but A can have a (permanent) relationship with a (physically male) woman B without this showing bisexuality. This example hangs on the gender theory that one uses. We mention two scenarios in this regard.
    • If “physical” is interpreted in a genetic way, then this may be: B can go through life as a “man” after surgical and hormonal procedures (for example, in terms of intimate relationships), but not formalize the gender transition. B is then still a woman, because B is never forced into transgdering. Essentialists would even find such a transition impossible or undesirable.
    • Alternative is an option that there is co-essentialist legislation: B is transgender based on self-identification. In doing so, B claims a female gender identity regardless of male physical gender, a masculinity that B also does not wish to dispute or contest. Then B is woman but it is understandable that A need not find her less attractive because of that.
  2. “A homosexual person (say A) is himself male.” In common parlance, this statement pretty much speaks for itself. But in the descriptions we advocate, there are alternatives:
    • To begin with, A can still be female after gender-affirming therapy (and without gender transition at marital status) but have (morphologically speaking) male physical gender and act as gay from that position.
    • It is also conceivable that under co-essentialist legislation, A is considered a woman but is still physically male and is still considered gay on that basis.
  3. “A man has the male genitals.” Usually true but again not always, for similar reasons as mentioned above.
  4. “Als twee mannen A en B geregeld seksueel contact hebben dan is sprake van een afwijking van de heteroseksuele norm.” Meest waar, maar niet altijd. 
    • If A is seen as female on the basis of co-essentialist legislation after matching self-identification but is considered physically male by all standards then there is little reason to establish a deviation from heteronormativity. Conversely, this is also true of B.
    • Also, B can be transsexual in a classic medical way without having made the fornal gender transition. Even then, it is not evident that a departure from the heteronormative line of conduct has occurred.

4. Gender and sexual orientation

We believe that formal gender theory (FGT) has a useful application in sexual orientation theory. If you read the many descriptions of sexual orientation, surely there is often talk of men and women. With that, gender inevitably enters the subject of SO. And with it, the ambiguities about gender.

Gender provides two sources of ambiguity: first, the dynamics of (the meaning of) the concept of gender (as we described in AGTRT-BF55 and AGTRT-BF56, the ICE reference model involves a succession of notions of gender). Second, the individual dynamics of gender categorization. A person can go through a gender transition and it can happen under different conditions. This makes it virtually impossible to draw from a person’s (formal, or possibly legal) gender any conclusion whatsoever about that person’s physical gender.

The APA definition of sexual orientation does not use the terms male and female, but that definition also does not clarify how an ST should be named or determined. It’s all very implicit. We assume that a number of ground rules are useful for designing a new narrative about SO that takes into account both concept dynamics and categorization dynamics.

The ground rules we are thinking of are these:

  1. Bij definities betreffende SO moet bij het gebruik van de termen man of vrouw, en jongen of meisje altijd extra informatie worden toegevoegd over de volgende kwesties: 
    • According to which notion of gender is a man (boy) or a woman (girl)?
    • What implicit assumptions (such as a man has a penis or a woman does not have a penis) are made?
    • It should not be implicitly assumed that someone is cis-gender; that too requires mention.
    • With terms like masculine, feminine feminine, masculine, feminine it is necessary to explain how it is meant.
  2. Because the concept dynamics of gender are complex and also dependent on place, time and jurisdiction, it is important for any definition (which includes gender-dependent terms) to also consider variants of the definition that function with a different notion of gender. Here, the ICE reference model can be used as an overview of potentially relevant notions of gender.
  3. Preference should be given to ensuring that the development of concepts does not create a circular dependency where gender becomes dependent on SO related concepts.
  4. A theory of SO should preferably not be based on exactly one variant of FGT.
  5. Terms like biological gender or physical gender are too vague. This always requires explanation: is morphological gender meant, or is chromosomes or gonads and gametes assumed? That really makes a difference that absolutely matters at SO. When using the term bodily gender, it is essential to take into account that that notion itself is subject to concept dynamics.
  6. There is always the risk that societal developments may turn against diversity in SO, and theory development on SO should not be made contingent on very vulnerable positions on gender, such as uninhibited co-essentialism, for example. Therefore, it is always also important to think through the theory of SO also from essentialism and from MotR versions of FGT.

5. Androgyny and sexual orientation

In ABGT, secondary gender identity (SGI) is central (see also AGTRT-BF20 and AGTRT-BF47). Here, gender is used to describe the different qualities of human consciousness, and how based on them, masculine, feminine and androgynous personality traits develop.

In ABGT, sexuality also plays a big role. The SGI functions not only as a way in which personalities develop, but also as a way in which these personalities then enter into sexual relationships.

Every human, according to ABGT, has potentially one of the following two variants of SGI: male or female. This concerns the orientation of the SGI, and it determines which of the two androgynous personality types a person has (dominant-male/subordinate-female is the first – male SGI for short, dominant-female/subordinate-male is the second – female SGI for short). These variants can then each be socialized patriarchally or matriarchally, producing different types of gender roles (male, female or androgynous).

Within ABGT, how a person’s SGI is grounded determines how sexual relationships are formed. Since it is assumed that sexual attraction can only take place by the grace of polarity, the coming together of a person with a male SGI and a person with a female SGI is necessary for the establishment of this sexual attraction.

Within ABGT, primary gender identity (PGI) and secondary gender identity (SGI) are separated, and also seen as two aspects of identity that function largely independently of each other. Someone with a male PHI (i.e. a cisgender or transgender male), does not necessarily have a male SGI. Herein, sexual orientation is important: (cisgender) straight men always have a male SGI, but (cisgender) gay and bisexual men can have a male or a female SGI. The same is true for people with a female PHI: (cisgender) heterosexual women always have a female PHI as well, but (cisgender) lesbian and bisexual women have either a male or female PHI.

Within ABGT, then, the distinction between sexual orientation and sexual attraction is important: the former concept relates to the PHI (or formally gender), and the latter to the SGI. We will hold this distinction in exploring the theory of sexual orientation so that justice can be done to the complexity and stratification of the concept of gender identity.

6. Questions about sexual orientation

Here are questions we want to look at:

  1. How do we define SO, first of all as a concept, but then also the different instances of SO?
  2. How do we deal with the dependence (of such descriptions) on the variant of gender theory we adopt?
  3. Does only (formal) gender play a role or also gender identity?
  4. Does FGT provide a different approach to definitions of SO than ABGT, if so do they complement each other?
  5. Is there an advantage to working with bidirectional descriptions of SO (over the monodirectional descriptions)?
  6. What relevance does the controversy between essentialism and co-essentialism have for the theory of SO?

7. Conclusion

The theory of sexual orientation is an example of a topic from theoretical sexology that can benefit from the insights about gender from FGT and ABGT. We will explore how this can be shaped in a series of blogs in the coming period, starting with the principles, ground rules and questions as formulated in this blog.