[AGTRT-BF43] TERF supporters should be asked more often what definition of bodily gender they use

Jan Bergstra & Laurens Buijs
Amsterdam Gender Theory Research Team

We have covered TERF ideology in previous blogs: the ideology of radical feminists who oppose transgenderism (see AGTRT-BF23, AGTRT-BF24 and AGTRT-BF33).

Read more about the TERF ideology:
The Dutch TERFs of the VOORZIJ Foundation maintain outdated positions on gender

TERF ideology comes in different forms. At the VOORZIJ foundation one finds what we call the Dutch TERF ideology. They oppose what they call gender ideology. They see this as a kind of conspiracy by which men can regain some of the rights historically acquired by women. They point to its negative impact on women, who have painstakingly acquired those rights through a 150-year feminist struggle.

Read more about the Dutch TERF ideology:
The complaints of the Dutch TERFs does not change their outdated position on gender

The Dutch TERF ideology turns gender theory into a conspiracy theory based on generalizations for which there is no substantiation. Evidence does exist of recent abuses of gender transition from male to female and that such abuses can violate women’s acquired rights. There is also evidence that gender theory in general radicalizes under the influence of “wokeness,” which may also have debatable interests behind it.

But there is by no means any evidence to suggest that all forms of gender transition have a problematic background or objective. Incidentally, this suggestion is not necessarily characteristic of all forms of TERF ideology. Of course, the fact that this is actively and fanatically espoused by VOORZIJ cannot and should not be blamed on the broader TERF ideology.

Read more about VOORZIJ:
Feminists and transwomen are allies rather than enemies: a rebuttal to Caroline Franssen of VOORZIJ

The broader TERF ideology can be well described using the notion of bodily gender. This means that of the interpretations of bodily gender mentioned in blog AGTRT-BF42 (listed again below), the fourth option for this ideology is dropped:

  • Morphologically determined binary sex at birth,
  • Morphologically determined sex at birth (neutral morphological sex also conceivable),
  • Morphologically determined sex at birth (in case of ambiguity, the physician can therefore choose a conception of biological gender and thus decide the case),
  • Morphologically determined sex (possibly modified during life and postoperatively),
  • Biological sex according to the characteristics of chromosomes,
  • Biological sex according to the structure/properties of gonads and gametes.

In our view, it is important that TERF advocates be explicitly asked the question of exactly what meaning they assign to bodily gender. This question is often evaded by arguing that it would be so obvious that further debate about it is unnecessary and leads to nothing.

Read more about bodily gender:
The concept of bodily gender better captures the complexity of biological sex

We can then ask them if they see bodily gender as morphological and shortly after birth determined (binary) sex, as is the case with TEFC adherents (see AGTRT-BF36). Many TERF supporters will then no doubt reply that that has since become obsolete and that biological sex is now meant. Then the question becomes relevant whether they want to determine physical gender based on the structure and characteristics of gonads and gametes, or rather on the characteristics of chromosomes. When they say they mean “self-evident” chromosomes, it can be answered that it is not self-evident at all, but merely a choice from a number of options. And that that choice has very little to do with the famous gender ideology.

Now let us assume that a supporter A of TERF ideology interprets physical gender as biological sex according to the characteristics of chromosomes. Now a person B comes into the picture in whom female bodily gender had been identified at the time based on visual inspection. B is AFAB as it is called: Assigned Female At Birth. But closer inspection reveals that, based on the characteristics of chromosomes, B has male biological gender, and thus male bodily gender (in A’s philosophy).

Read more about applying the concept of physical gender:
How can the concept of bodily gender be concretely applied in gender theory?

Next, suppose B makes it known that B shares A’s view and is “essentially” a man. B pursues gender affirmative therapy and hormonal treatment, obtains these therapies and now wants to officially gender transition. The question for A is then: is B’s wish reasonable?

If so, A has thereby conceded the reasonableness of gender transition, at least in some circumstances. Thus, this does not make A transexclusionary (and thus not TERF), because B may be transgender in the classical sense of the word: B has a different gender than assigned after birth.

If not, the question is how A intends to justify this rejection in a moral/ethical sense. Maybe then A will say that this way would be the gateway, or will be able to come up with some other argument. But we do not believe that such a rejection by A of B’s desire for gender transition can ultimately be credibly justified.


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