[AGTRT-BT6] Indicative definitions versus demarcative definitions of sexual orientations

Jan Bergstra & Laurens Buijs
Amsterdam Gender Theory Research Team

In formal gender theory (FGT), we work on and with the notion of formal gender. This is a notion that can have different meanings in different versions of FGT. Any concrete example of a concept of formal gender is complicated because formal gender must explicitly have a demarcative description. By this we mean that ideally we would like to be able to determine from such a description (definition) of each person what formal gender this person has. Particularly in so-called difficult cases, the description should be able to provide the answer.

Against demarcative definitions are indicative definitions. You see 100 examples of a bird and now you know what a bird is, but then with a penguin you can still have trouble if it was not among the examples, just like with the ostrich. Indicative definitions arise in the computer through machine learning, something the computer already appears to be very good at at this time. Demarcative definitions are not yet easily created through AI, but what is not can come. There are notions that hardly lend themselves to an indicative definition, such as the concept of “Dutchman.” The simplest thing is simply to describe exactly what is meant by that. Is it about a passport or registration in the population register? Does that already make someone who has been granted the right to become a Dutchman? Et cetera.

Undesirable behavior is usually described through indicative definitions, while prohibited behavior is preferably described through demarcative definitions. In gender theory, gender identity is a notion defined through indicative definitions while formal gender (and legal gender) is actually defined demarcatively. Therefore, equating the two notions (as co-essentialism dictates) is not plausible from this simple theory of definitions.

After this introduction, we look at sexual orientation (SO). How should we view the definitions of, for example, the following SO nouns: straight man, straight woman, gay man, lesbian woman, bisexual man, bisexual woman?

Indicative definitions are much easier to give here than demarcative definitions. And that has to do with the fact that each definition of the different STs uses a notion of gender and that there are no uniform globally valid definitions in that area.

Example of an indicative definition of gay man:

• Indicative definition of gay man: A gay man is an adult who meets the following 4 conditions:
  • is AMAB (male physical gender at birth) and (legally) cis-gender,
  • Has male physical gender according to morphological criteria,
  • has maintained an affective or exclusively erotic, and physically experienced, short-term or long-term relationship, on a long-term basis (i.e., not incidentally but in a pattern), with one or more other adult persons who are subject to (i) and (ii) above satisfy,
  • Has not at any time (including incidentally) maintained a physically experienced, short-term or long-term relationship, with one or more other (adult or non-adult) AFAB (female physical gender at birth) persons.

At first glance, this definition excludes a transman from being a gay man, but we should not read it that way, because this is (intentionally) an indicative definition. While the definition makes sufficient prima facie demands (those who meet it can be considered gay men), it also makes too strong demands (not every gay man meets it). Nevertheless, a false positive is conceivable in a person who, although he has not had intimate contact with AFAB cis-gender persons, (sure he) would have liked to have and only did not experience it due to lack of opportunity or opportunity to do so. For demarcation, this definition is less appropriate for these reasons.

We believe that indicative definitions are very important because they at least allow one to explain the intent of a concept well, and that their use is advisable provided it is clearly stated that it is an indicative definition and that no judgments may be made about individuals based on it.

In the demarcative definition below, “affective or exclusively erotic” is substituted for “erotic,” this is to avoid an unclear middle ground (and thus possible false positives).

• Demarcative definition of gay man: A gay man is an adult who meets the following conditions:
  • has male legal gender,
  • has maintained an erotic, and physically experienced, short- or long-term relationship after the most recent legal gender transition (or in the case of a cis-gender person since birth) on a long-term basis (i.e., not incidentally but in a pattern), with one or more other adult persons of male legal gender,
  • Has not, after the most recent legal gender transition (or in the case of a cis-gender person since birth), at any time (even incidentally) maintained a physically experienced, short- or long-term relationship, with one or more other adult persons of female legal gender (at the time of contact with that person).

This demarcative definition leaves nothing to be desired in terms of clarity, but that then requires being clear about what is meant by legal gender, and that depends on the jurisdiction. A change in the law that changes the options for gender transition may just result in a person who sees himself as a gay man being able to or having to view that differently and vice versa. As an example, take gay man P who is in a steady relationship with gay man Q. Now Q makes the gender transition to woman without further physical intervention. With this new fact, P might want to be able to take the step of seeing himself as a heterosexual man, but with the above demarcative definition at hand, he cannot. The past with the female partner gets in P’s way in this regard. As with the indicative definition, false negatives are possible by the way.

For completeness, here are also corresponding definitions for heteroman. These definitions are not unproblematic and therefore the addition that an attempt is involved. We see here that it is not at all easy to make definitions of gay man and straight man symmetrical.

• Indicative definition of heterosexual man [1st ATTEMPT]: A heterosexual man is an adult who meets the following conditions:
  • is AMAB (male physical gender at birth) and (legally) cis-gender,
  • Has male physical gender according to morphological criteria,
  • Has maintained an affective or exclusively erotic, and physically experienced, short-term or long-term relationship, on a long-term basis (i.e., not incidentally but in a pattern), with one or more other adult cis-gender AFAB persons,
  • Has not at any time (even incidentally) maintained an affective, and physically experienced, short-term or long-term relationship, with one or more other persons (adult or otherwise) who meet the first two requirements above.

This definition has the problem that a person without intimate relations cannot be a heterosexual man. So there may be something to that. Perhaps the next adjustment will improve on that point.

• Indicative definition of heterosexual man [2nd ATTEMPT]: A heterosexual man is an adult who meets the following conditions:
  • is AMAB (male physical gender at birth) and (legally) cis-gender,
  • Has male physical gender according to morphological criteria,
  • in addition, either 1 and 2 are met, or 3 is met:

1. Has maintained an affective, and physically experienced, short- or long-term relationship on a long-term basis (i.e., not incidentally but in a pattern), with one or more other adult cis-gender AFAB persons,
2. Has not at any time (even incidentally) maintained an affective, and physically experienced, short-term or long-term relationship, with one or more other persons (adult or otherwise) who meet the first two requirements above,
3. Has not had an intimate relationship with any person so far and has self-identified in terms of SO as a heterosexual man.

This definition again has the objection that it is not easy to give a symmetrical definition of gay man, because it is not obvious beforehand that we want to see self-identification as a sufficient criterion.

We conclude with two more attempts at a demarcative definition of heteroman:

• Demarcative definition of heterosexual man [1st ATTEMPT]: A heteroman is an adult person who meets the following conditions:
  • has male legal gender,
  • Has maintained a long-term (i.e., not incidental but in a pattern) erotic (and possibly affective), and physically experienced, short-term or long-term relationship, with one or more other adult legally female cis-gender and AFAB persons,
  • Has not at any time (even incidentally) engaged in an erotic, and physically experienced, short-term or long-term relationship, with one or more other (adult or non-adult) AMAB persons.

• Demarcative definition of heterosexual man [2nd ATTEMPT]: A heteroman is an adult person who meets the following conditions:
  • has male legal gender,
  • in addition, either 1 and 2 are met, or 3 is met:

1. Has maintained a long-term (i.e., not incidental but in a pattern) erotic (and possibly affective), and physically experienced, short-term or long-term relationship, with one or more other adult legally female cisgender and AFAB persons,
2. Has not at any time (even incidentally) engaged in an erotic, and physically experienced, short-term or long-term relationship, with one or more other (adult or non-adult) AMAB persons.
3. Has had no short- or long-term erotic relationship with any person so far and has self-identified in terms of SO as a heterosexual man.

Comments

1. The above attempts at definitions are meant to be illustrative only and serve more to clarify the questions that arise when you try to arrive at somewhat conclusive definitions than that one should or could work with them in any framework.

2. With each of these, it is unclear what is meant by “affective” and by “physically experienced relationship” and what exactly “not incidental but in a pattern” means.

3. Providing useful demarcative definitions of the various SOs is not yet so easy. Whether the distinction between indicative and demarcative yields anything remains to be seen.

4. From the outset, a question is whether it is ethically justifiable to classify people in this way. The fact that classifications can be scientifically substantiated does not immediately yield that it is also appropriate to design, let alone use, these classifications in detail.

5. The complexity of these definitions shows that concept engineering, and presumably ICE (incremental concept engineering), inevitably already exists here.

6. It is obvious that in different jurisdictions the definitions of SO, as well as the enumeration of possible SOs, will differ.

7. There are a number of jurisdictions worldwide in which (anno 2024) any SO other than straight man or straight woman is explicitly seen as problematic at times and is even banned and criminalized. In such jurisdictions, demarcative defnitions are used that match the evidentiary requirements of the relevant jurisdiction in terms of the clarity required. For example, those evidentiary requirements are different in a Sharia-based legal system than in a law and rule-based system as we have in the Netherlands.

8. The question arises whether in devising a system of conclusive and manageable definitions of an all-encompassing system of SOs, the researcher(s) involved is not, in a morally reprehensible, and also culpable, way, providing technical support (even if unintentional) to jurisdictions whose very principles one does not wish to subscribe to. Is there an important dilemma here, or does it just seem that way?

9. The dating system now common in the West can result in being asked questions such as “are you bisexual?”. Then there are certainly these three aspects involved:
   1. Do they want to answer honestly?
   2. Do we want technically (conceptually) correct answers?
   3. How does one escape unwanted stigma as the result of “staying in the system”?

For each of these aspects, the system of definitions used is important.