Jan Bergstra & Laurens Buijs
Amsterdam Gender Theory Research Team
Structure of this blog
- Introduction
- Questions about gender identity
- Gender identity and concept engineering
- The relationship between gender identity and gender categorization
- Conclusion: FGT and gender identity
1. Introduction
We want to start focusing more on gender identity in a number of blogs. Reasons to take a closer look at gender identity abound. Although certainly in progressive circles it is quickly assumed that this concept has a clear meaning and a solid scientific foundation, in reality this is very disappointing.
Gender identity plays a central role in co-essentialism. This is the current dominant current in progressive gender studies, but also, for example, in (radical) trans activism. This movement has “gender identity first” as its central principle: those who see themselves as men (women) should also be seen as men (women). In other words, gender identity would determine a person’s gender categorization. With this logic, increasingly liberal legislation regarding gender transition is being implemented.
Yet the scientific literature is anything but clear on the meaning of gender identity. Here we list the main questions about gender identity, and then elaborate on how formal gender theory (FGT) can help answer some of those questions.
2. Questions about gender identity
Gender identity is thus given great importance within co-essentialism: gender is seen as a derivative concept of gender identity. But despite the great importance attached to it, strikingly answer me about it. This becomes clear when carefully looking at the literature in gender studies. Here we formulate 14 questions about gender identity that in our experience have not yet been properly answered.
1. Does everyone have a gender identity?
First, the question remains open as to whether everyone actually has a gender identity. At least according to philosopher Elisabeth Barnes (University of Virginia), this is not the case, she described in her publication Gender without Gender Identity: The Case of Cognitive Disability (2022). She argues that there are people with low IQs, for example, who are unable to identify themselves as male or female (or otherwise). She also argues that it is absurd to therefore not see these people as either men or women. The idea that gender identity is always leading in determining whether someone is male or female thus falls flat.
2. Is there such a thing as gender orientation?
In addition, it has sometimes been suggested that gender identity might be compared to sexual orientation (see AGTRT-13). The idea then is that people would have not only a sexual but also a “gender orientation,” in other words a sense of being male or female that is established early in birth, and about which one can “come out of the closet” at some point.
The logic according to gender orientation is then: a person is (usually) assigned male or female at birth (AMAB or AFAB: assigned male/female at birth), but that need not be appropriate to that person’s gender orientation. It can then take many years for a person to realize that their own gender identity differs from the gender assigned at birth.
Once that understanding is there, it may take time for a person to disclose their own gender identity to third parties, and then time again passes before the person’s gender categorization is adapted to their gender identity (if at all).
We note that the literature offers no evidence to support the hypothesis of gender orientation. But the literature is also completely unclear about how it works then. The classic nature versus nurture question regarding gender identity is completely open.
3. Do people know their own gender identity?
To what extent is it possible for people to know their own gender identity? According to theFirst Person Authority (FPA) principle, it is. That is, those who claim gender identity A are right to do so based on FPA. But if this is already true in some cases, is it true in all?
4. How old do you have to be to know your own gender identity?
From what age is it reasonable to assume that a person knows and can name their own gender identity? Here the views are far apart.
5. How should the relationship between gender dysphoria and gender identity be viewed?
Is gender dysphoria or gender incongruence a matter of a gender identity deviating from the “gender assigned at birth,” or is that far too simplistic a view?
6. What is neutral gender?
Is neutral gender a positive gender identity or is it more a case of the absence of male and female gender identity?
7. Can everyone oversee all gender identities?
Those who want to define their own gender identity must understand what the different options (male, female and neutral) mean. Is it reasonable to expect a person to have visibility into each of the possible gender identities?
8. What are the differences in theorizing about gender identity?
In a general sense, there is little visibility into gender identity theorizing. Are there different theories about gender identity, and if so, what are those theories and how do they differ?
9. How are gender catorization and gender identity related?
The concept of formal gender depends on concept engineering and deals with how gender is categorized in a given context, in other words, what is seen as male, female or neutral in a given context. Gender identity is a person’s own assessment of their own formal gender. In the literature on gender identity, we do not encounter any dependence of that concept on the notion of gender one holds.
10. What role does concept engineering play in gender identity?
Is the idea that gender identity also determines gender categorization now one of many possible outcomes of the concept engineering of formal gender, or is concept engineering actually out of the question for someone who actually considers gender identity of great importance?
11. What role can insights from psychoanalysis and analytical psychology play in the conceptualization of gender identity?
Does ABGT (Androgyny-Based Gender Theory, see gender-theory.org/) now provide more insight into the concept of gender identity? We assume that without a serious psychological and philosophical analysis, the concept of gender identity is not going to have sufficient meaning, and we certainly see the intellectual tradition of Freud, Jung and Lacan as an option for developing such an option.
12. Can a person have a gender identity without theoretical study?
Is it obvious that a person “has” and expresses a gender identity without prior theoretical study of that concept? We believe not.
13. How can gender identity be provided with an understandable definition?
If gender identity is a major determinant of gender categorization, it is still necessary for gender identity as a concept to have an intelligible description.
14. How can gender identity play a role in moderate positions on gender and gender transition?
In a MotR(middle of the road) notion of gender, we assume that gender identity does influence gender categorization but not an all-important influence. In doing so, it is not necessary or expected for everyone to have a distinct gender identity. Gender identity we see as a phenomenon with a label (m,v,n) but also with a strength. Only strongly felt and preferably palpable gender identity then plays a role in gender categorization.
3. Gender identity and concept engineering.
Below we first address how formal gender theory (FGT) can play a role in removing ambiguity about the concept of gender identity. We therefore begin with question 10: whether concept engineering is also relevant to the concept of gender identity.
We suspect so, but the situation is considerably less clear than for formal gender. In developing a notion of gender identity, we have less of a clear starting point than with physical gender, and the development of legislation in different jurisdictions also provides few starting points.
In formal gender theory (FGT) and in the literature on gender theory in recent years, gender identity plays a leading role, yet, as mentioned above, little becomes clear about what exactly gender identity is or can be. In AGTRT-1, we provide the following definition of gender identity:
- Gender identity-A (of a person P) is the answer a person P gives to the question: what is the gender (to be chosen from male, female and neutral) that best suits you? In doing so, P has the option of not answering and then we arrive at ?.
We refer to this definition of gender identity here as gender-A. This raises the question of whether we can use concept engineering to design other notions of gender identity that can play a role in gender theory. We think so.
To begin, we provide here four more options that assume a specific designation of the concept of gender. Thus, one difference between gender identity-A and the other four is that gender identity-A does not involve a substantive designation of the concept of gender from which P can choose. However, even when such a designation is indeed given, we can still provide a subjective description that reflects an associated gender identity. Then you get the following definitions gender-B1 to gender-B4:
- Gender identity-B1 (of a person P) is the answer a person P gives to the question: what is the physical gender (to be chosen from male, female and neutral) that best suits you? In doing so, P has the option of not answering and then we arrive at ?.
- Gender identity-B2 (of a person P) is the answer a person P gives to the question: what is the morphological gender (to be chosen from male, female and neutral) that best suits you? In doing so, P has the option of not answering and then we arrive at ?.
- Gender identity-B3 (of a person P) is the answer a person P gives to the question what is the biological gender (to be chosen from male, female and neutral) that best suits you? In doing so, P has the option of not answering and then we arrive at ?.
- Gender identity-B4 (of a person P) is the answer a person P gives to the question what is the gender-2000 (to choose from male, female and neutral, and see AGTRT-BF38 for gender-2000) that best suits you? Thereby, P has the option of not answering and then we arrive at ?.
It thus becomes clear that it is very paradoxical to use gender identity to determine gender, as co-essentialism wants. Because gender identity is what a person thinks about their own gender. In doing so, surely someone needs a minimum of information about the concept of gender.
This makes a definition of gender based on gender identity circular, as also evidenced by variants gender-B1 to gender-B4. This circularity was also addressed by Thomas Bogardus in Why the trans inclusion problem cannot be solved (2022).
It seems that concept engineering regarding the concept of gender identity cannot be escaped, and in this regard, avoiding circularity by interacting with successively different descriptions of gender plays a key role.
But what exactly should or can be pursued with such concept engineering is not immediately clear. In any case, along the line of concept engineering for the concept of gender identity, one can also try to work towards it that a transinclusive notion of gender can be designed.
Starting from gender-1900 (or binary gender based on morphological gender), a gender identity with neutral gender can be designed: if a person neither sees himself as male nor sees himself as female then one can say that the gender identity is neutral. But then it is not obvious that neutral gender is a positive choice. Only after gender-2000 has become commonplace (that is, neutral gender as a gender label has taken hold) is it plausible that a person will also begin to refer to neutral gender as a positive choice.
4. The relationship between gender identity and gender categorization.
Question 9 in the list of gender identity questions above is about the relationship between gender identity and gender categorization. Based on our work on formal gender theory and concept engineering (ICE), there is already a lot to say about this.
It seems that each time a concept of (formal) gender is socially recognized and accepted, a notion (sentiment, concept) of formal gender can develop from there that deviates from it. Over time, social pressure then arises to realign gender classification with the now changed ideas of gender identity.
This dynamic can be seen as follows: alternately, a new concept of formal gender (after social adaptation) leads to a new concept of gender identity and a new concept of gender identity (after it has become sufficiently popular, and after successful political pressure) leads to a new concept of formal gender (and its social acceptance).
5. Conclusion: FGT and gender identity
In this blog, we have laid out some questions about gender identity, and then elaborated on how formal gender theory (FGT) can help create more clarity around the concept of gender identity. In doing so, we paid particular attention to questions 9 and 10, about the relationship between gender identity and gender categorization, and the role that concept engineering can play.
If the “round about” model of ICE is adopted, then achieving trans-inclusiveness is an illusion, not a meaningful goal. Thomas Bogardus (2022) argued the same thing earlier, but with different arguments.
On the contrary, it is then obvious that there will always be a tension between gender (read: formal gender as accepted in the jurisdiction one is looking at) and gender identity (read: the currently modern literature on how one deals with the existing gender classification and how one feels about it).
Of course, it cannot be ruled out that one day one may find a notion of gender (formal gender) that is completely stable in the sense that this does not involve the subsequent development of a slightly different notion of gender identity.
The Roman Catholic Church is searching for its “own story” about gender appropriate to our times (see also AGTRT-BF19). It is obvious that when that is found it will be claimed to be stable in the sense that everyone, that is, every believer, will be asked precisely not to develop a deviant gender identity.
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