[AGTRT-BF57] Gender theory abstracts from sexuality, offering opportunities for new theorizing about sexuality

Jan Bergstra & Laurens Buijs
Amsterdam Gender Theory Research Team

Structure of this blog

1. Introduction
2. Gender theory abstracts from sex
3. FGT as a basis for sex research
4. Conclusion: a possible renewal of theoretical sexology
5. Notes on terminology

1. Introduction

With the concepts of man and woman, of course, the notion of sex is always close, regardless of sexual orientation. And yet sexuality plays no significant role in gender theory, at least not in the last 30 years.

In gender theory, sexuality is abstracted from: thinking about gender no longer depends on theoretical or other assumptions about sexuality. And therein lies a great strength, because it means that gender theory can be used as a solid base from which to approach themes that touch on a sexuality.

Our own Formal Gender Theory (FGT, see gender-theory.org) is also an example of gender theory that abstracts from sexuality. In our view, FGT does this more completely and consistently than many alternatives in gender theory. Gender studies is a rich field full of interesting trends, yet quickly characterized by all kinds of ideologization. FGT was developed in part to answer that.

Our team plans to explore in the near future how formal gender theory can form a basis for what we call a “theoretical sexology.” With FGT, great complexity and diversity in the definitions of male and female can be accommodated, which can be useful in many aspects of the study of sexuality.

2. Gender theory abstracts from sex

Of the authors encountered in gender theory, only two, to our knowledge, have also written about sexual orientation: Robin Dembroff in What is Sexual Orientation? (2016) and Kathleen Stock in Sexual Orientation: What Is It (2019).

Dembroff explicitly takes the step of taking 3G gender theory with three genders (or “3G gender theory” with genders male, female and neutral) as a starting point, and viewing orientation as being oriented to one of the three genders of 3G.

That theory of Dembroff then becomes quite complex, but is still a marvel of simplicity compared to the latest views on sexual orientation. Whether Dembroff’s story is convincing is another matter; we are not convinced of that ourselves.

Thus, in other gender theories, sexuality is often not even mentioned. One might say that gender theory is “abstracted” from sexuality: gender is made into an abstraction that no longer leans on theoretical assumptions about sexuality. How does this abstraction actually work?

To begin with, gender theory takes the social state of things and its dynamics as its starting point. Around 1900, there was a “two gendered society” (2G society) and slowly the world evolved (in different jurisdictions at different rates) into a “three gendered society” (3G society).

Also, the phenomenon of gender transition emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. In describing these developments, one does not actually encounter sexuality. The focus is mainly on the phenomenon of gender dysphoria, which functioned as a trigger for the emergence of the possibility of gender transition.

And anno today, the goals of gender theory do not go much further than to properly understand (and possibly influence) the dynamics of the concept of gender and of the phenomenon of gender transition.

Through a combination of the variation in concepts of gender that have been developed, on the one hand, and further development of the notion of gender transition, on the other, the concept of transinclusiveness emerges. Currently, this concept in particular is being systematically analyzed in gender theory.

Added to this, a premise of gender arises through the notion of bodily gender. Physical gender is interpreted differently by different parties and in different times.

Classically, physical gender can be equated with morphological gender, or what you can see externally and, in the vast majority of cases, immediately at birth. Recently, physical gender is often equated with some form of biological gender, for example looking at the composition of chromosomes, or at the relative size of gonads and gametes, or recently (see also AGTRT-BF52) with the results of functional MRI of the brain.

These different descriptions of biological gender and also morphological gender have in common that there is no reference to sexuality involved, at least in determining a person’s gender.

3. FGT as a basis for research on sex

Formal gender theory (FGT) can exist independently without a prior theory of sexuality. And this has an important consequence that Dembroff saw and used clearly back in 2016: modern gender theory can be used as a starting point for theorizing about sexuality (or: theoretical sexology). This is an idea we want to develop further.

Using FGT as a starting point here has advantages over other options. For example, the literature on sexual orientation is extremely complex and might look simpler with gender theory as a starting point. Dembroff has already picked up on that, but we don’t find that convincing yet, as mentioned. Taking the theory of sexual orientation as a starting point for theoretical sexology is conceivable in principle. But that project runs aground on the complexity of modern considerations of sexual orientation.

FGT can handle a high degree of diversity and complexity in thinking about gender difference, and is also designed around the idea of the emerging “3G society,” giving neutral gender a place as well. This is relevant to sexology in many ways.

For example, today’s society struggles with the definition of such a concept as sexual harassment (perhaps simply a form of discrimination based on gender, and no more than that). Sexually unwanted or sexually transgressive behavior are also notoriously slippery concepts, which can be shaped more firmly with FGT as a foundation.

We also naturally see all sorts of difficulties in introducing neutral gender into policies that have so far focused on gender equality. It can be expected that the topic of neutral gender, and how it relates to, for example, the social and legal position of men and women, will only lead to more difficulties and discussions in the years to come.

4. Conclusion: a possible renewal of theoretical sexology

The abstraction of sexuality in gender theory thus offers opportunities: gender theory in a general sense (and FGT in particular) can serve as a neutral starting point for sexological theorizing.

This also paradoxically creates, in time, all sorts of new ways of studying sexuality precisely in connection with gender: they are and will, of course, remain interrelated phenomena.

We will therefore explore in upcoming blogs and publications the possibility of arriving at a “theoretical sexology” based (in part) on formal gender theory (FGT).

5. Notes on terminology

On the concept of “theoretical sexology”:

• The term theoretical sexology is not commonly used, but we found a somewhat dated use of the term at KU Leuven.
• The term “theoretical sexology” appears regularly in the literature, yet is not very common, and “theoretical sexology” sometimes has as an alternative the more common “philosophy of sex,” see for example here.
• We think theoretical sexology is a fine term precisely because all parts of sexology also have a theoretical side, and because practically useful theory need not necessarily be philosophical.