[AGTRT-BF55] The ICE method monitors the consistency of the overall argumentation when a definition of gender is changed

Jan Bergstra & Laurens Buijs
Amsterdam Gender Theory Research Team

Structure of this blog

  1. Introduction
  2. Morphological versus biological gender
  3. Legal gender
  4. Starting point for ICE: step by step design
  5. Conclusion: strive for global consistency

1. Introduction

In previous blogs (see AGTRT-BF38 and AGTRT-BF54), we have described how the ICE method can be helpful in discussions about gender. We base the ICE method on the insights of our formal gender theory (FGT). This method allows the definition of gender to be changed without creating all sorts of logical inconsistencies with arguments given in the past. That can help discussions related to gender (such as those about transgender and gender transitions, and legislation about them) flow better and with less polarization.

Read more about ICE’s added value to the gender debate:
Understanding more about how the concept of gender has changed over time is helpful to the discussions at hand

Read more about how the definition of gender is monitored by ICE:
A change in the definition of gender must be firmly justified with ICE

The main purpose of ICE for formal gender is not to provide a reconstruction of the genesis of a specific notion of gender at a given time in a given social order and jurisdiction. But it can be helpful to make such a (global) reconstruction. Working that way reveals the arguments that have been used up to that point in that context. In this blog, we recap how that works, and what it achieves.

It is obvious to provide ICE with a starting point in which gender is established at birth (or: assigned male/female/neutral at birth, abbreviated AMAB, AFAB and ANAB). We assume that it is recognized from the outset that it is not always possible to determine gender at birth (with the consequent option of ANAB: assigned neutral at birth). ANAB involves an initially very small minority of cases, not large enough to give rise to the development of specific regulations or gender theory. We refer to the initial notion of formal gender as Gender-1900 in our ICE reference model.

Gender-1900 we thus choose as our starting point. Formal gender, in the context of Gender-1900, is morphological gender as determined at birth. Morphological gender is determined based on visual inspection. So the formal gender conform Gender-1900) of person P is the same throughout P’s life as the morphological gender as determined at birth. That starting point corresponds to the state of affairs through the centuries until around 1900.

2. Morphological versus biological gender

Morphological gender is determined based on visual inspection of a human body, usually at birth. Biological gender is a concept that has emerged from modern biology and medical science. In this regard, chromosomes, gonads, gametes, and hormone levels play a more important role than morphological characteristics.

In the process, an unexpected effect occurs: visible genitalia can no longer be used aptly for gender determination. Biological gender, moreover, can be defined in different ways, but we will leave this additional complication unaddressed here. When asked, we choose a definition based on the comparison of gonads and gametes.

Morphological gender is “transition permissive” (see AGTRT-1), or allows a person (male or female) to transition to another morphological gender (female or male) through medical and pharmaceutical interventions. The various non-morphological definitions of biological gender do not have this very feature: it is difficult to imagine at this time that a person’s biological gender is altered by medical intervention.

This distinction between morphological gender and biological gender is of paramount importance because since roughly 1950 the view has gained ground that morphological gender provides an approximation of biological gender. The thought now is: it was finally meant to determine biological gender, and it can be done better now than when only morphology was considered. Morphological gender is thus obsolete, and then no longer plays a role as an independent concept.

This seemingly innocuous shift in perspective produces a major change regarding gender transition. Viewed from the standpoint of morphological gender, gender transition has been a medically-technically solved problem since, say, 1975, for which, at most, social acceptance is a matter of debate. Social acceptance of morphological/hormonal gender transition was a realistic option.

But seen from a standpoint of biological gender, (F2M as well as M2F) gender transition is simply impossible, and for this reason the question of social acceptance of gender transition can initially be dismissed as irrelevant. So there are different forms of essentialism: essentialism based on morphological gender and essentialism based on biological gender.

If biological gender is taken as the starting point to explain gender transition (M2F and F2M), it is inevitable that the meaning of gender must be changed. With that, concept engineering of the concept of formal gender inevitably comes into play. A notion of gender must then be designed that accommodates the desired forms of gender transition.

With that, the question becomes relevant as to exactly what the desired forms of gender transition are. As more forms of gender transition are accommodated, increasingly different notions of formal gender are at play. There are various forms of gender transition that can be accommodated:

  • Morphological/hormonal gender transition as a solution to gender dysphoria. This leads to Gender-1975 and after adoption of biological gender as the basis for concept engineering also to Gender-1995;
  • Morphological/hormonal gender transition based on free will decision (Gender-2005);
  • Partial morphological/hormonal gender transition as a solution to gender dysphoria (Gender 2005);
  • Partial morphological/hormonal gender transition based on free will decision (Gender-2005);
  • Non-morphological/hormonal gender transition as a solution to (Gender-2005);
  • Behavior modification without medical intervention, but with a psychological examination of the motivations and understanding of the consequences of gender transition. This examination may lead to a rejection of the transition wish (Gender-2015);
  • Successive free choice of ever different gender without further investigation or admission (Gender-2025(?)).

With each “wish” in terms of the permissibility of gender transition comes another, different notion of formal gender. The move to the latter “wish” is now under discussion in a number of countries, and that move is proving to be highly controversial. But even the earlier steps, some of which have already been realized in legislation in many jurisdictions, still generate considerable opposition and debate.

Legal gender is the implementation of gender categorization. It is like declaring the birth of a child. Then the “citizen X” is created, in the legal sense. X, of course, was there a few hours or days earlier, and the categorization into male, female or neutral also happened earlier. Our story is about gender categorization, and not about the subsequent steps in government (civil registration) accounting.

By legal gender we denote gender as it appears in databases, identity documents, etc. Legal gender emerged at a time when morphological gender was the dominant notion of formal gender.

Since 1950, however, the view has gained ground that legal gender can be seen as a legalized form of biological gender rather than a legalized form of morphological gender.

Gender transition usually involves a change in a person’s legal gender. The determination of legal gender is based on legislation that takes a particular notion of formal gender as its starting point.

4. Starting point for ICE: step-by-step design

Each stage of concept engineering of “formal gender” must be explained again and again as a result of incremental concept engineering with morphological gender as the starting point. Each step involves a need for justification, justification and accountability. Of great importance is to maintain a clear view of the totality of the arguments for each of the steps involved at all times.

Specifically, any ICE pathway that seeks to accommodate ever wider forms of gender transition must first show how to accommodate the most restrictive form of gender transition (morphological/hormonal gender transition).

With morphological gender as a starting point, it must then be made clear why social acceptance for morphological/hormonal gender transition is so highly desirable that new legislation is called for.

With biological gender as a starting point, moreover, it must be made clear why a corresponding adjustment of the notion of formal gender is desirable (or even morally required) so that morphological/hormonal gender transition can be accommodated on that basis.

5. Conclusion: striving for global consistency

The premise of ICE, then, is to always keep sight of the totality of arguments when a definition of gender is changed. Thus, with ICE, successive notions of formal gender are always designed in a consistent manner that increasingly effectively accommodate a family of desirable forms of gender transition.

When the third step is based on arguments that are diametrically opposed to the very arguments that mattered in the first step, there is an internal inconsistency that must be analyzed and justified. This is not a priori impossible, but it must be done.


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