[AGTRT-BF54] A change in the definition of gender must be firmly justified with ICE

Jan Bergstra & Laurens Buijs
Amsterdam Gender Theory Research Team

Structure of this blog

1. Introduction
2. Step by step less suppression with ICE
3. The move from Gender-1900 to Gender-1975
4. Moving from Gender-1975 to Gender-1995
5. Conclusion: ICE requires solid motivation

1. Introduction

In blog AGTRT-BF38, we outlined ICE (incremental concept engineering) for gender, as a methodology that can advance the discussion around gender. In doing so, we named a series of seven consecutive notions of formal gender. The idea here is that concept engineering always leads to the next notion of gender. All together, there is incremental concept engineering, so the coherence of the body of arguments is always guarded.

Learn more about our ICE methodology for gender:
Understanding more about how the concept of gender has changed over time is helpful in the discussions at hand

In this blog, using the first two steps of our first ICE reference model, we show that a change in the definition of (formal) gender, places high demands on the rationale for such a change when working with concept engineering .

For starters, we’ll recall the ICE approach we’ve currently developed. We call the following series of notions of formal gender and the steps between them the first ICE reference model.

• Gender-1900 (a “classic” starting point),
• Gender-1975 (gives the option of transsexing formulated in terms of gender, but takes advantage of the fact that morphological sex is “transition permissive”),
• Gender-1995 (handling the transition from use of morphological sex to biological sex, first application of “concept engineering,” gender now sometimes differs from biological sex),
• Gender-1997 (less stringent requirements for success of medical/pharmaceutical gender affirming interventions, aspects of gender identity come into play),
• Gender-2000 (introduction of neutral gender, introduction of gender identity),
• Gender-2005 (less focus on medical/pharmaceutical transsexing, application of gender identity in explaining M2F and F2M gender transition),
• Gender-2015 (gender identity becomes leading, but gender transition requires checks and balances),
• Gender-2025 (gender identity is the only relevant criterion).

2. Step by step less suppression with ICE

The successive notions of formal gender in the first ICE reference model have the following property: each successive notion gives more possibilities of transgendering than the previous one. It is common to think of it this way that a subsequent notion in the series is more trans-inclusive, because trans-inclusiveness of the notion of gender would be the goal.

In his article Why the trans inclusion problem cannot be solved (2022), Tomas Bogardus provides strong arguments for the view that a notion of gender cannot be trans inclusive. Our blog on Marcus Dib’s position (see blog AGTRT-BF37) provides a better criterion: each subsequent notion must be less “oppressive” than the previous notion.

Thereby, it is a premise that any notion of formal gender, however designed, will always be oppressive to some degree. The latter insight is a matter of logic (applying a variant of the liar paradox).

Thus, to the first ICE reference model, we want to add an argumentative basis that motivates each step: the oppressive effect of the notion of gender used is diminished, to the point that it outweighs the disadvantages of the step.

Finding an argumentative basis for the first ICE reference model is not so easy. We ourselves are not convinced by the arguments for moving from Gender-2005 to Gender-2015, and we are not at all convinced by the arguments made for moving from Gender-2015 to Gender-2025. We see strong arguments for the steps leading to Gender-1997.

In moving to Gender-2000, it is unclear to us how neutral gender is to be dealt with in labor market decisions (equal opportunities for men and women, and now neutrals?). But we can go along with the idea that Gender-2000 reduces oppression against people who feel neither male nor female in relevant ways, and that that benefit endures regardless of the fact that being gender-neutral in the labor market creates an unclear position and possibly a disadvantage.

In moving to Gender-2005, we believe that insufficient account has been taken of the fact that Gender-2005 does involve the disadvantaging of the interests of groups of people (compared to Gender-2000). The move to Gender-2015 also did not take into account the interests of disadvantaged groups and individuals, and that effect continues more forcefully into Gender-2025.

The move from Gender-1900 to Gender-1975 of the first ICE reference model achieves the situation that under some (to be determined) circumstances gender transition in concept is possible and acceptable.

In a political sense, the question of how, what and why of this step is obsolete in many countries because there is already legislation in place that allows gender transition. ICE requires that each time a subsequent design step is taken that slightly modifies the concept of gender, the entire chain of arguments (for all previous steps) in an appropriate reference model is thought through from scratch.

Here we look at a justification for the move from Gender-1900 to Gender-1975 and a justification for the move from Gender-1975 to Gender-1995. The major difference between Gender-1900 and Gender-1975 is that gender is no longer necessarily fixed from birth. In Gender-1975, gender can change during life, but this requires successful surgical and pharmaceutical interventions.

3. The step from Gender-1900 to Gender-1975.

Because Gender-1900 is based on external characteristics (morphological gender, as it is still often applied at birth), the step to Gender-1975 is unproblematic. After all, gender transition is a fact once a sufficiently visually determinable similarity to the desired other gender is achieved.

Medical science has shown that this can be achieved in many circumstances. And thus it is then demonstrated that a gender transition has been achieved without changing the definition of gender. In AGTRT-1, we name a concept of gender that allows gender transition “transition permissive.” Morphological gender allows gender transition and is thus “transition permissive.”

What then remains to be done is to designate such a transition as legitimate (that unlike biological gender). This situation can be compared to the legitimization of expressions of homosexuality. Given that homosexuality exists, there is then still the question of whether to allow its expression.

We see that motivating the move from Gender-1900 to Gender-1975 falls into two parts. First, motivating that gender transition is theoretically possible (and that is easy to do as described above). And second, justifying that there are sufficiently strong grounds to allow and facilitate gender transition in practice (including through legislation).

The rationale for gender transition begins in the context of gender assigned at birth (or AMAB, AFAB) based on morphology. The rationale for gender transition (as a phenomenon) is then as follows:

1. In some men (women) suffering from gender dysphoria, an appropriate combination of surgical procedures and hormonal treatments produces an outcome that (viewed from a morphological gender perspective) involves a transition to woman (man). Consequently, when this transition is legitimized in the marital status, the person concerned turns out to be very good with the new situation.
2. There are no persons who would be harmed by a gender transition (of another person) as described under the first point).
3. The advantage that the person involved in such a gender transition can have is so great that it outweighs two undeniable disadvantages. First, the medical and pharmaceutical interventions on the person. And second, the administrative issues associated with both the administrative and legal introduction of the gender transition phenomenon. Those administrative steps are obviously one-time per jurisdiction.
4. Gender transition according to point 1 can be seen as a surgical-pharmaceutical solution to a psychiatric problem.

We see these arguments as sufficient for the move from Gender-1900 to Gender-1975. Gender-1975 is less “oppressive” than Gender-1900 because people with gender dysphoria have a better chance of resolving their problems.

Moreover, there is no significant group of individuals who could be disadvantaged by the transition to the use of Gender-1975. Here, being opposed to Gender-1975 on theoretical grounds (e.g., the TERF or TEFC mindset, see AGTRT-BF43 and AGTRT-BF44) is not seen as a disadvantage in the introduction of Gender-1975. Disadvantage refers to the occurrence of a personally relevant disadvantage in daily life, and the introduction of politics that one does not support is not an example of that.

4. The step from Gender-1975 to Gender-1995.

The move from Gender-1975 to Gender-1995 is both difficult to make and difficult to explain. We imagine that between 1975 and 1995 the concept of bodily gender transforms from morphological gender to (a form of) biological gender. But at the time, we also had to prevent that transformation from preventing a trans woman in 1975 (trans based on morphological gender) from being seen as a trans woman in 1995. Through a simultaneous “renewal” of the notion of gender, it can be achieved that those who were transgender in 1975 still are in 1995, regardless of the transformation that the underlying notion of bodily gender has undergone. We discuss this in more detail below.

When one defines biological gender based on the size of gonads and gametes, surgery and hormone therapy do not help. Then a person’s biological gender cannot be changed, at least not with the current state of medical science. The only way gender transition is still possible requires that gender be redefined and in such a way that gender can clearly differ from modern biological sex.

In that case, an attempt may be made to repeat the rationale for the move to Gender-1975. So this time with the assumption that, in principle, a biological gender is established at birth, even though in practice which is often still based on visual inspection, this can sometimes go wrong. On reflection, a problem arises with the justification for the move to Gender-1975 (or more precisely with the move to legitimize gender transition).

The achievement of trans-inclusion with the move to Gender-1975 is called into question by the new focus on modern biological gender. This situation calls for conceptual engineering to begin now, changing the notion of gender such that gender transition becomes theoretically possible (with or without prior surgical and hormonal treatments).

The discussion of legitimacy now becomes much more difficult: it must first be justified why the concept of gender must be modified to satisfy, in principle, a desire for trangendering. And then it must be justified why in specific cases, given such a desire, the corresponding gender transition should then also be allowed and facilitated.

There are still all kinds of complications unfortunately:

1. There is a curious interaction here. Gender transition can only be allowed when it is theoretically believed to be possible. And a clear justification for making theory so (or concept engineering) that gender transition becomes possible in principle can only be found if it is clear that the aim is to actually legitimize such transitions. This aspiration arises, for example, when citizens want to preserve the rights gained with the move from Gender-1900 to Gender-1975, and the favorable treatment outcomes, even if not morphological but biological gender determines the definition of bodily gender.
2. The classic arguments for the move to Gender-1975 come from a time when neutral gender was not yet prevalent. Now that neutral gender as an idea has been widely accepted the question does arise whether not gender transitions from male or female to neutral can solve the problems for which Gender-1975 and Gender-1995 were envisioned as solutions. We do not claim that this is possible, but rather that the necessity or reasonableness of accepting M2F and F2M gender transition cannot be seen if it has not first been investigated whether alternative transitions (namely M2N and F2N) achieve the same goal.
3. To see the moral necessity of enabling gender transition, the importance of gender assignment must first be justified. After all, if gender does not matter, then neither does gender transition. In doing so, the pitfall of linking gender assignment to time-dependent expected or even required patterns of behavior must be avoided. For example, even if it is thought that men should always do the dishes, the unwillingness to wash dishes still cannot be an acceptable motive for a man to pursue or claim an M2F transition. In that situation, social resistance to unwanted patterns and expectations is a much more obvious option.
4. Assuming that biological gender is defined in such a way that no one can use medical and pharmaceutical steps to make an M2F or an M2F gender transition (e.g., via gonads and gametes), a justification must be provided as to why the notion of gender should be modified such that in some cases a biological male is seen as a person of female gender (and thus a woman), or a biological female is seen as a person of male gender (i.e., a man).
5. This justification becomes even more difficult when it is alternatively considered to allow for the four options M2F gender, F2M gender, M2N gender, and F2N gender in addition to (cis)male, (cis)female, and (cis)neutral gender.

5. Conclusion: ICE requires solid motivation

Having listed all these complications, we can see that ICE has high requirements for motivating the various steps. We assume that the move from Gender-1975 to Gender-1995 is perfectly justifiable based on positive experiences with gender transition based on the move from Gender-1900 to Gender-1975. Especially given that gender transition usually occurs in individuals for whom morphological gender and biological gender correspond.