[AGTRT-BF49] Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini: another step in the concept engineering of gender

Jan Bergstra & Laurens Buijs
Amsterdam Gender Theory Research Team

Structure of this blog

  1. Introduction: Kirk-Giannini in the light of FGT
  2. Response to Byrne: what is a woman?
  3. Concept engineering: gender-1 and gender-2
  4. Inclusive genders as a follow-up to Barnes
  5. Gender identity without circular reasoning
  6. Conclusion: inclusive genders versus Jenkins and FGT

1. Introduction: Kirk-Giannini in the light of FGT

In March 2023, we published our first report (AGTRT-1) on formal gender theory (FGT), outlining how FGT can contribute to gender theory, and specifically the “gender inclusion problem.” This is the question of whether and if so how to define the terms male and female so that these terms become inclusive to transgender and gender neutral persons.

Gender theory, of course, is not standing still in the meantime. Recently published How to solve the gender inclusion problem (2024) by Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (Rutgers University, Newark). This is a surprisingly readable paper; anyone with an interest in modern gender theory should really take a look at it. For each important reference, the author also provides a citation indicating exactly what is being referred to, so you hardly need to search previous texts to understand the article.

In this article, Kirk-Giannini attempts to develop an understanding of gender that is trans-inclusive through a method we in FGT call concept engineering. We warmly welcome this attempt; we too think that through concept engineering a progressive response can be given to Alex Byrne’s gender-critical answer to the question of what a woman is in his article Are women adult human females? (2020). Byrne answers that question with Women are adult human females, providing a definition of woman that is not inclusive to trans women. Kirk-Giannini makes good strides toward a trans-inclusive definition of a woman, but still does not properly resolve some pressing issues.

2. Response to Byrne: what is a woman?

Kirk-Giannini claims that Byrne’s gender-critical assertion “A woman is an adult human female” (abbreviated AHF, see also AGTRT-BF42) should be seen as an assertion about how ordinary language works, interpreting “woman” in the most common way possible. According to Kirk-Giannini, AHF’s trans-exclusive charge can thus be “unshielded.”

Surely this view seems to us to be a real misunderstanding, for if it were, the sharp discussion between Alex Byrne and Robin Dembroff would not have taken place (see also AGTRT-BF11). Reading Byrne (2020) really does give us the impression that Byrne arrives at a definite of woman (AHF) that is trans-exclusive.

3. Concept engineering: gender-1 and gender-2

Kirk-Giannini then makes a move that would not be out of place in Formal Gender Theory (FGT). To explicitly indicate that with male and female arise the metaphysical notions of male and female that are not common in the vernacular but are the result of purposeful concept engineering, gender-1 (for female) and gender-2 (for male) are used. We might add gender-3 for neutral. This is presumably a useful step, entirely in the style of FGT.

We think Byrne’s definition of woman (as AHF) means that for any reasonable interpretation of gender-1, “a person of gender-1 is an adult human being with female physical gender” (see AGTRT-BF42). In doing so, Byrne denies that “reasonable” concept engineering can produce a notion of gender that is trans inclusive in such a way that a person who is physically male is seen as female (the intended meaning of gender-1). In other words, according to Byrne’s views, the current transgender law in the Netherlands is already indefensible.

Gender-1 and gender-2 are thus the unknowns that the quest for a gender-inclusive notion of gender tries to track down. If such a thing can exist at least, because it is not obvious beforehand. The method of that search is concept engineering, and although Kirk-Giannini delivers a textbook example of concept engineering, Kirk-Giannini himself does not use that now-classic term.

4. Inclusive genders as a follow-up to Barnes

Kirk-Giannini (like ourselves) sees Elizabeth Barnes’ recent papers as essential input for next steps of concept engineering. In the article Gender without gender identity: the case of cognitive disability (2022), Barnes introduces the notion of “disability inclusion.” She shows that those who demand that every person of gender-1 see themselves as women (in terms of gender identity) inevitably encounter as a problem that some congnitively limited persons should not be seen as women because they are unable to see themselves that way. That, of course, would be an unreasonable and also undesirable state of affairs.

Thus, the notion of gender-1 is not sufficiently inclusive for “cognitively disabled” persons (with female physical gender). Either disability inclusion of that notion thereby falls short. Barnes concludes that basing gender categorization solely on gender self-identification (i.e., gender identity) leads to insufficient disability inclusion (of the notion of gender associated with that convention). And disability inclusion is desired, so such a notion of gender is not sufficiently inclusive.

Kirk-Giannini then comes up with the following solution, under the name “inclusive genders.”

“If an individual has a gender identity, they belong to Gender 1 just in case they identify with Gender 1. If an individual lacks a gender identity, they belong to Gender 1 just in case they are feminized in a suitably broad range of contexts. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for Gender 2.”

Inclusive genders as a definition of gender-1 achieves the goal that a cognitively impaired woman (more precisely, an adult person with female physical gender who is unable to consciously articulate in words how to see herself as a woman) can still be classified as a woman by a benevolent environment. Kirk-Giannini thus takes the obvious follow-up step to Barnes (2020).

5. Gender identity without circular reasoning

Kirk-Giannini also cites Bogardus (2021), who claims that a gender-inclusive notion of gender cannot exist. We have already stated in AGTRT-1 that we do not find Bogardus’ argument compelling on that point. According to Kirk-Giannini, Bogardus mistakenly claims that identifying gender-1 with “having gender identity female” is circular, because here it does not mean “having gender identity gender-1.” Woman would have a different meaning here. We do not see that other meaning. So we disagree with Kirk-Giannini: it is indeed circular reasoning when it is stated that woman means “a person who identifies as a woman.”

The concept of gender identity is both central and “difficult” according to Kirk-Giannini:

“What does it mean to say that an individual identifies with Gender 1? To say this is just to say that they instantiate the property other theorists have picked out using phrases like identifies as a woman or has a female gender identity. Though I wish to remain as neutral as possible regarding the correct theory of gender identity, for present purposes I would be happy to adopt a version of Jenkins’s internal map account of gender identity, described in Section 2, and say that what it is for an individual to identify with Gender 1 is for that individual to have an internal map that is formed to guide feminized individuals through the social or material realities that are characteristic of feminized individuals as a class. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for Gender 2.”

That inclusive genders could be based on this notion of gender identity we do not believe. We strongly question whether any person who is not cognitively impaired is really capable of forming an opinion about their own gender identity with such a description of gender identity at hand. By the looks of it, a straight man with no feminist background faces a hefty literature review if he were to apply this description to himself. And besides, even if you have that “internal map,” that doesn’t say anything about your place on that “map,” even though that’s what this is about.

This makes it relevant to reiterate the case of Marcus Dib (see AGTRT-BF37). Marcus Dib is transman, but also gender critical and an opponent of the notion of gender: he finds it oppressive. So he also opposes gender-1: he “has no gender.” If a supporter of “inclusive genders” nevertheless “glues” that person to a gender, that is oppressive (not so much transexclusive as transexpansive: it imposes a gender).

Read more about Marcus Dib’s case study:
Marcus Dib is transsexual but not transgender: what does this mean for gender theory?

We believe that Marcus Dib has shown that a notion of gender can also be transexpansive, and thus it is also possible to assign a gender to a person too often, especially when that person does not want it. Kirk-Gianinni’s idea of inclusive genders is also, in our view, transexpansive, and thus ultimately unsatisfactory. The amendment Kirk-Gianinni makes by allowing individuals who do not have a gender identity to have one assigned to them by third parties provides an “overshoot” to individuals who consciously choose not to have a gender identity.

6. Conclusion: inclusive genders versus Jenkins and FGT

Kirk-Giannini further cites Katherine Jenkins’ notion of “gender pluralism” in the article. Jenkins argues gender pluralism is an inclusive approach that embraces and respects the diversity of gender identities, including through respect for self-identification and inclusive language.

Kirk-Giannini, in our view, correctly argues that Jenkins’ gender pluralism does not provide a workable solution to the trans inclusion problem. Surely the answer to the question “what is a woman” then remains too much up in the air and becomes too arbitrary. But even for Kirk-Giannini, there is no escaping the fact that the notion of gender identity cannot be defined unequivocally. Along that route, pluralism also re-enters Kirk-Giannini’s “inclusive gender” definition of Gender-1, and yet presents the same problems as Jenkins’ approach that accepts pluralism on gender from the outset.

In AGTRT-BF32 and AGTRT-BF34 we described how to arrive at a (we believe) more useful concept of gender in the context of FGT. But this does not negate the fact that Kirk-Giannini does take a “logical step” forward in terms of concept engineering for gender. We had missed that step in the development of FGT and would not have been out of place (as an intermediate step) in our development of FGT. Through criticism of “inclusive genders,” one can then take the next step, and we assume that one will. After all, concept engineering can proceed along several paths.


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