Jan Bergstra & Laurens Buijs
Amsterdam Gender Theory Research Team
In blogs AGTRT-BF41 and AGTRT-BF42, we introduced the notion of bodily gender. This is a notion that can take into account the various definitions of a male or female (or neutral) body in circulation, from morphological to biological. Physical gender, moreover, can change across place and time.
We believe that bodily gender is a new concept: we have not previously encountered it in the literature. But the literature is very large and we certainly may have overlooked work.
Our goal is to be able to separate the philosophical and ideological aspects of formal gender (about which there may be controversy) from those aspects of gender that, on reflection, are precisely not part of gender theory. Gender theory begins where a notion of formal gender becomes of central importance that is not determined solely by physical factors.
It is an oversimplification to state that physical gender is the same as biological gender (or biological sex). Biological gender today has modern connotations with genetics and the biology of the reproductive mechanism as cornerstones. But traditionally, when a child was born, gender was determined by visual inspection, and we want to refer to that notion as morphological gender.
By bodily gender we mean the notion changing over time (and at different rates in different jurisdictions) that around 1900 could be identified with morphological gender and over 100 years later is primarily identified with biological gender. It is this gradual and in different places differential overhang from one meaning to another that makes the notion of bodily gender relevant.
Gender essentialism is the movement that holds that our bodies determine gender, that is, what is a man and what is a woman (see AGTRT-BF36). With the concept of bodily gender, we can redefine a man (woman) according to essentialism:
A man (woman) is an adult person of male (female) physical gender.
This allows us to articulate an essentialist view of male versus female without having to directly take into account the differences between divergent interpretations of bodily gender.
In this way, it becomes clear that the phenomenon of gender transition as it had emerged say 1975 (see AGTRT-BF38) can be made entirely appropriate within the essentialist view of gender. If one believes that morphological gender can be changed by medical intervention then (as long as one understands physical gender as morphological gender) gender transition is simply possible and also plausible. It is then even conceivable that gender transition becomes an acquired right, at least under specific conditions.
In recent decades, however, physical gender has increasingly been seen as biological gender. Then again, gender transition becomes less plausible. But with the concept of formal gender (usually simply called gender), the now acquired right to gender transition can still be defended. Indeed, this is a notion of gender that differs from bodily gender, and yet allows for gender transition based on morphological gender, despite the fact that bodily gender is now interpreted as biological gender.
It seems that this movement has actually occurred this way in history. Her concept of formal gender has subsequently made several more steps, so that ultimately the relationship with the concept of bodily gender is now virtually nonexistent. Breaking away from that relationship between bodily gender and formal gender is what characterizes gender co-essentialism (see AGTRT-BF16). Co-essentialism underlies what is often called “woke” gender ideology.
The introduction of formal gender was a useful step with few negative consequences. But in the development of formal gender, gender ideology has been derailed. In our view, it is neither necessary nor productive for formal gender to be separated from physical gender to the extent now proposed in the proposed new transgender law (see AGTRT-BF17 and AGTRT-BF18).
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