Jan Bergstra & Laurens Buijs
Amsterdam Gender Theory Research Team
We have spent the past year developing our own gender theory, called formal gender theory, with the goal of countering polarization in the debate about gender. Formal gender theory makes it possible to develop Middle of the Road versions (MotR versions) of gender theory that attempt to reach a compromise between conservative and progressive voices in the debate, which are now often extremist and unable to find each other.
Learn more about our formal gender theory:
Why gender science may pay more attention to formal gender
We have distinguished two such extreme positions: essentialism (which sees the distinction between men and women as highly fixed) and co-essentialism (which sees the distinction between men and women as highly malleable). Within essentialism, no space is usually given to the transgender phenomenon, while within co-essentialism it is readily stated that whether one is a man or a woman is merely a matter of personal experience and one’s own choice.
Read more about the middle ground between essentialism and co-essentialism:
Our middle-of-the-road approach to gender is the middle of seven flavors of gender theory
Formulating MotR versions of gender theory makes it possible to arrive at gender theories that take moderate positions on the transgender phenomenon. We call these transmoderate positions. In this blog, we show how it is possible to develop such transmoderate gender theories.
In our search for a middle ground between gender-essentialism and gender-co-essentialism, or our search for MotR versions of gender theory, we rely first on the following premises, GT1-11.
GT1: Gender we read as formal gender (i.e., explicitly not social gender, biological gender, or psychological gender);
GT2: Gender is a concept closely related to biological sex but can deviate from it under circumstances. The version of gender theory one adopts determines what circumstances that may be;
GT3: “Biological sex” and “biological gender” we consider synonymous (i.e. have the same meaning). There is no fixed and uncontroversial definition of biological gender; there is a range of options for such a definition. Formal gender differs somewhat but not too much from biological gender;
GT4: For gender there are three options: male, female and neutral (to be more precise, for formal gender, biological gender, social gender, and psychological gender there are always three options: male female and neutral);
GT5: Under circumstances, a person can go through a gender transition. The six possibilities for gender transition are: M2F, F2M, M2N, F2N, N2M, N2F. Of these, M2F and F2M are the most common, followed by M2N and F2N, but that may be a picture of the times and that may change in the future;
GT6: Gender transition occurs at least in the classic situation when a person has undergone all the relevant surgical, medical, pharmaceutical and hormonal procedures traditionally referred to with transsexuality (or, more accurately, being transsexed).
GT7: (i) Gender transition is at least possible along the classical line of transsexing based on full gender-affirming therapy.
(ii) Gender transition is possible more broadly than under the conditions of (GT7i) above (See AGTRT-4 for further explanation of this point), namely in cases where medical conditions and judgments place limits on the rationale/feasibility of continuing gender-affirming therapy.
GT8: (i) It is conceivable, under conditions, that a person with male biological gender may have female formal gender after transition without medical intervention,
(ii) It is conceivable under conditions that a person with female biological gender may have male formal gender after transition without any medical intervention,
(iii) It is conceivable, under conditions, that a person with male or female biological gender may have neutral formal gender after transition without medical intervention,
GT9: We characterize gender essentialism as follows: one assumes
(i) gender = biological gender = biological sex,
(ii) one chooses a definition of biological sex that never changes during a person’s lifetime (one need not see it that way; in Iran, for example, one sees it differently today),
(iii) from (ii) follows that 5) above is “impossible” and that gender transition need not be facilitated either.
GT10: Gender-co-essentialism we characterize as follows:
(i) Gender is in principle disconnected from biological sex, gender (i.e., formal gender) resembles psychological gender rather than biological gender, gender (i.e., formal gender) does come under the influence of social gender.
(ii) A person is as much responsible for (and decisive about) their own gender as they are about their own gender.
(iii) Within the co-essentialist view, there are different views on the social engineering of gender, but that idea is primarily that for a person, their own gender is a perception rather than a choice. This perception is called gender identity. (The underlying reality provided it exists, not everyone believes it, is called gender orientation).
(iv) It is desirable, if not necessary, that formal gender and gender identity be compatible in the sense that everyone has the right to adopt (have recognized) a formal gender which corresponds to their (most recent self-perceived) own gender identity.
GT11: A male (female) is an adult person with male (female) formal gender.
Now to the question of how we get from these principles to a gender theory that takes moderate positions on transgender. We list a few such “transmoderate positions” here. These positions are formulated using explicitly the pro-trans positions GT6 and GT7 as assumptions. Each of the ten positions below identifies opportunities for or constraints or preconditions regarding gender transition.
GT-MotR1: Gender transition (that is, change of formal gender during a person’s lifetime) is in principle done at the initiative and under the responsibility of the person affected. This person is called P below. The role of third parties is assistance (medical, psychological or social) on the one hand, and supervision of enforcement of rules of the game (as described below) on the other. We first (and only) describe the four transition types M2F, F2M, M2N, F2N.
NOTE: The exceptional situation where a person P is assigned a different gender on the authority of third parties cannot in theory be ruled out but is not addressed here, nor is P required to have an opinion about such a scenario.
NOTE: Gender transition is conceivable in principle without gender-affirming medical therapy.
GT-MotR2: P endorses the following definitions: a man (woman) is an adult person of male (female) formal gender. P is aware of a definition of gender (either self-given or taken from third parties) that makes clear why P may have an interest in undergoing a gender transition.
GT-MotR3: Gender transition is in principle a (conditional) right of P but against that right there are also duties and responsibilities of P.
GT-MotR4: P recognizes that gender transition involves a deviation from a norm, namely the cisgender norm (namely the norm that one is and remains cisgender). P recognizes the rationale and value of the cisgender standard, and P does not wish to dispute it, assuming that in necessary cases it can be deviated from. P realizes that gender transition involves exercising the right to deviate from a norm and for that reason alone carries obligations.
GT-MotR5: P has fundamental respect for the situation of many who are male, female or neutral from birth and based on physical classification. Thereby rejecting gender erosion as an objective, one explicitly does not see a (presupposed) societal desire (or one’s own desire) for gender erosion as a motivating component of self-perception of gender, or the determination of one’s own gender identity),
GT-MotR6: P must recognize and appreciate that M2F gender transition may pose a risk to the women who may thereby see rights and securities acquired through years of feminist activism compromised. P must recognize that F2M transition (albeit to a lesser extent) carries similar risk.
GT-MotR7: P knows that abuse of the gender transition is undesirable, and
GT-MotR8: P realizes that existing regulations on gender tend to support the pursuit of similar social status for men and women and that similar regulations are often insufficiently clear in the presence of transgender persons. P pledges not to try to misuse outdated regulations to their own advantage (yet deviating from the “spirit” of the regulations in question). P recognizes that making gender regulations transcompatible not only costs a lot of money but also raises hard-to-answer questions that often have not been resolved by the day of gender transition
GT-MotR9: P recognizes that psychological gender can differ from formal gender. P acknowledges that androgyny can sometimes provide a handle on dealing with gender dysphoria. P recognizes that with the androgynous spectrum at hand, it is conceivable that “they” (people like P) could find a different solution to the given problem in which not the whole person is given a singular gender, but in which different personality traits assemble into a spectrum of male/female distributions per trait.
GT-MotR10: P sees its own transition as the solution to a problem in which P has the task of striving to ensure that as a result of this solution a (operational) problem is not created for third parties. That third parties must accept gender transition (from P) even if such is contrary to their version of gender theory is something P cannot and need not prevent.
The transmoderate version of formal gender theory (tmvoFGT) that arises with a procedural notion of gender transition according to the rules of thumb as mentioned above we denote by tmvoFGT[BB,12/23,v1]. Variants of this that are closer to gender essentialism can be considered just as variants that are closer to gender co-essentialism. Thus, “around” tmvoFGT[BB,12/23,v1] emerges a family of versions of FGT that could act as a bargaining space when essentialists and co-essentialists see the the need for consultation and compromise. We do not mean to argue that tmvoFGT[BB,12/23,v1] is immediately the best option in this space of MotR versions of gender theory. But we do think that tmvoFGT[BB,12/23,v1] can be a very useful starting point for the exploration of this space.
With tmvoFGT[BB,12/23,v1], we (finally) have a basically practical MotR version of FGT in the research in the field of FGT that we are conducting. That was missing until now. We now know that the pursuit of MotR versions of formal gender theory involves a realistic goal, and is not merely a product of (our) wishful thinking (which has been the situation so far anyway). We may now assume that practically manageable MotR versions of FGT can actually be designed. With this additional fact at hand, the FGT project can now proceed in a more systematic manner.
A next step involves formulating a set of requirements (also known as requirements in ICT terms) that we want to place on a MotR version of FGT. We call these requirements PvE-motr-fgt. We now know that we are aiming for tmvoFGT[BB,12/23,v1] to meet at least the requirements as collected in PvE motr-fgt. Then it is possible to see what bargaining space in either direction PvE-motr-fgt allows.
In terms of terminology, the following point is still somewhat vague: what is the relationship between MotR and “transmoderate”? We assume that MotR is a container for versions of FGT that lie between essentialism and co-essentialism. Transmoderate is only part of the MotR versions of FGT. A feature of transmoderate versions of FGT is “requirement” GT8, or that gender transition does not necessarily always involve medical intervention. We assume that a MotR version of FGT will at least endorse GT7, but not necessarily GT8.
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