[AGTRT-BF21] Our middle-of-the-road approach to gender is the middle of seven flavors of gender theory

Jan Bergstra & Laurens Buijs
Amsterdam Gender Theory Research Team

In AGTRT-9, we listed a series of versions of gender theory and arranged them according to increasing transinclusiveness.

Although instructive, said overview does not provide sufficiently useful names for the versions yet to be designed. But such names are easy to come up with if we limit the number of versions to seven, running from essentialist (gender as highly fixed) to co-essentialist (gender as highly malleable):

1. Essentialist version of gender theory;
2. Moderate essentialist version of gender theory: the sharp edges of essentialism off;
3. Liberal-principled essentialist version of gender theory: the core of essentialism is guiding while, to the extent possible, individual wishes are also always respected;
4. MotR (middle of the road) version of gender theory: an (intended) compromise between the two extremes (or: a compromise between liberal-principled essentialist version of gender theory and liberal-principled co-essentialist version of gender theory);
5. Liberal-principle co-essentialist version of gender theory: the core of co-essentialism is guiding while, to the extent possible, individual desires are also respected;
6. Moderate co-essentialist version of gender theory: the sharp edges of co-essentialism off;
7. Co-essentialist version of gender theory.

Among the sharp edges of essentialism we can think of: denying gender dysphoria, denying transsexuality/transgendering as a possible medical solution to gender dysphoria, denying any form of neutral gender, as well as confusing gender with sexual orientation. An essentialist version of gender theory is found in the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), as well as among some groups of Evangelical Christians and among the TERFs (Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminists).

A moderate essentialist version of gender theory sometimes accepts exceptions to rules so that these sharp edges come off. This acceptance of exceptions takes place to avoid too great conflicts with dissenters, but not so much on the basis of substantive arguments that are part of essentialist thinking. In AGTRT-4 we described that a person’s condition may be such that (say male to female) transsexing does not exist while there are good grounds to speak of (male to female) transgendering. Such considerations fit into a liberal principled essentialist view.

Among the sharp edges of co-essentialist versions of gender theory we count: (1) Men who for opportunistic reasons identify/categorize themselves as women and then use their new gender to harass women, or otherwise harm their interests. (2) Gender-affirming therapy (including irreversible surgery) based solely on the wishes of the individual. A moderate co-essentialist version of gender theory sometimes accepts exceptions to rules (e.g., rights for women do not always apply to transgender women) so these sharp edges come off. This acceptance of exceptions takes place in order to avoid excessive conflict with dissenters, but not so much on the basis of substantive arguments that naturally fit co-essentialism.

Read more about our critique of co-essentialism:
Netherlands needs a gender-critical movement

In an earlier blog (AGTRT-BF19), we explained that different parties within the Roman-Catholic Church hold different versions of gender theory (including the essentialist version of gender theory, the co-essentialist version of gender theory and an opening to a moderately gender-critical version of gender theory), and that the project to design a version of gender theory that is definitive, or at least usable for the Roman-Catholic Church as a whole for a longer period of time, is not yet complete.

We expect that the Roman-Catholic Church will first formulate and then adopt a moderately essentialist gender theory, and only secondarily devise and adopt a liberal-principled essentialist gender theory. This order of things would be a missed opportunity though, because it is precisely in designing a liberal-principled essentialist gender theory that is manageable for the Roman-Catholic Church that the question arises as to why one wants to embrace an essentialist view of man and woman. With the essentialist version of gender theory and with the moderate essentialist version of gender theory, the choice of an essentialist premise is a religious axiom, so to speak.

Read more about the discussion of gender in the Roman Catholic Church:
The Roman Catholic Church has more diversity in views on gender than one might think

In the interview in The Pillar with Cardinal Eijk (see also AGTRT-BF19), he argued that there is primarily a theological argument in favor of the essentialist view: if the concepts of man and woman fade, then so do father and son, and thus the explanation of the relationship between man and God, set in those terms, also loses meaning in an irreplaceable way. This primary argument may be decisive for those who found this part of the Roman-Catholic Church’s teaching of great importance, but the argument loses value in other circles. One still wonders then: are there other non-theological arguments for gender essentialism that are not so strict and formalistic that no exception can be made for any more?

In AGTRT-6, we considered a set of conditions under which it is increasingly plausible for a man (woman) to be a person of male (female) gender (both in the biological sense). As these conditions become stronger, the plausibility that a person can transform from male to female or from female to male solely by a will reversible at any time decreases. Along this line, a restriction of gender categorization based on gender self-identification can be described, and such considerations could find a place in a liberal principled co-essentialist version of gender theory.

The new transgender bill that had been proposed from the House of Representatives and has since been declared controversial is co-essentialist. The change that Pieter Omtzigt’s NSC would like to make makes the proposal moderately co-essentialist. For our project to design a MotR version of gender theory, it makes sense to first identify convincing suggestions for the two liberal-principled versions of gender theory and only at the next stage figure out what possible compromises exist between them.